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In the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, most Eastern European countries aimed first of all to 
maintain positive relations with their main strategic partner, the United States. This 
priority was closely connected with NATO, Eastern Europe’s preferred collective defense 
organization. Eastern European governments were concerned that if they supported the 
position of France and Germany regarding the Iraq crisis, the greater U.S. frustration with 
present and future European NATO partners might have eventually led to a weakening of 
the NATO collective defense commitment and a reduction in U.S. interest in Europe. 
This outcome would have signified the disappearance of the security guarantee that most 
Eastern European countries have been seeking since the beginning of the 1990s and that 
they would prefer to rely on in the long term. Eastern European countries are prepared to 
make significant efforts to uphold NATO’s effectiveness. Indeed, the main mission of 
Eastern Europe in the future may be to keep the United States effectively engaged in 
Europe and to sustain NATO’s cohesion and relevance. It is possible that NATO will 
survive in the long term partly because Eastern European countries have enthusiastically 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the factors that led thirteen Eastern 
European governments to take pro-American positions regarding the Iraq crisis in 2002 – 
2003. It then assesses the implications of these factors for politics in Europe and 
transatlantic relations. 
The analysis addresses the following questions: How were the positions regarding 
the Iraq crisis set in these Eastern European countries? Why were the positions in all 
these Eastern European countries pro-American? What is the importance and relevance 
of this fact? How will Eastern European orientations favorable to U.S. policy influence 
the future development of NATO and the EU? 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
On 30 January 2003, the leaders of eight European countries published a letter 
expressing support for the U.S. position regarding the Iraq crisis. Besides the 
governments of Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, three Eastern European 
governments – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – signed the letter.1 
On 5 February 2003, the leaders of ten Eastern European countries published a 
similar statement of support for U.S. policy regarding the Iraq crisis. This letter was 
signed by a group of Eastern European countries known from their cooperation 
concerning membership in NATO as the “Vilnius group” - Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.2 
In March-April 2003, Poland contributed troops to the U.S.-led military campaign 
against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The Czech Republic deployed a chemical 
defense unit in Kuwait for possible use in the war in Iraq. Hungary allowed the United 
                                                 
1 The full text of the letter available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03013007.htm [15 April 2003] 
2 The full text of the statement is available at 
http://www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Iraq/Feb0503VilniusIraq.html [15 April 2003] 
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States to conduct the training of Iraqi opposition members who would serve as 
interpreters for the U.S. troops in Iraq at the Taszar military base.3 
Furthermore, almost all of these countries have assigned military and civilian 
assets to the post-conflict rebuilding process in Iraq. Some of these countries may also 
deploy personnel and equipment in Bahrain, Kuwait, or Qatar. 4 
Why did these thirteen Eastern European countries support the U.S. position in 
the Iraq crisis?5 Was it a spontaneous reaction to the rapidly evolving events or was it the 
predictable result of a decade of Eastern European security policy developments? What 
happened to the political, economic, cultural, historical and geographical connections of 
Eastern Europe with Germany and France, which adopted another view on how to resolve 
the Iraq crisis? Finally, how will the pro-American positions taken by these Eastern 
European countries influence the development of NATO and the EU? 
It is important to answer these questions because they will help to determine the 
future of NATO and trans-Atlantic relations. In other words, these questions concern the 
future of security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. 
 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
What have been the main factors influencing Eastern European positions and 
diplomatic reactions towards the Iraq crisis? Specific factors, it should be recognized, 
may complement or contradict each other. 
Has the main influence on the decision-making of the Eastern European 
governments been a concern for physical security?  Have Eastern European governments 
                                                 
3 Jeffrey Donovan, “Eastern Europe: Vilnius Group Supports U.S. On Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 
February 2003, available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/02/06022003175020.asp [15 November 2003] 
4 Of the thirteen Eastern European countries listed above, only Slovenia does not plan to make any direct military 
contributions to the stabilization operations in post-war Iraq.  
Ken Guggenheim, “U.S. Senate Approves NATO Enlargement, Asks To Review Consensus Policy,” Associated 
Press, 8 May 2003, available at http://www27.brinkster.com/licenta/fise.rez.det.asp?art_id=399 [15 May 2003] 
5 Azerbaijan and Georgia also supported the U.S. position regarding the Iraq crisis. Nevertheless, in this thesis the 
term “Eastern European countries” is used to refer to the policies of the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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seen it in their national interests to keep a balance of power in Eastern Europe by 
encouraging continued U.S. involvement in this region to balance Russia?  
To what extent is historical heritage a factor – the “grey zone” legacy of Eastern 
Europe? Are Eastern Europeans still skeptical about the role of international law in 
relation to the realities of power politics? Do Eastern Europeans fear that they will again 
experience a situation in which everyone but at the same time no one in particular is 
responsible for events in Eastern Europe?   
To what extent are the key influences the human and moral dimensions?  How are 
differences in the historical backgrounds of Eastern and Western European countries 
reflected in their policies concerning war and peace?  
 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the emergence of the Iraq 
crisis and how it initially was addressed by the United Nations Security Council and 
major NATO countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
The chapter then reviews how the Iraq crisis unfolded during the period prior to the use 
of force in March-April 2003 and how two distinct positions (and groups of countries) 
appeared in transatlantic diplomacy. 
Chapter III discusses the historical processes, contemporary events, and security 
policy assessments, which led the Eastern European governments to support the 
American position on how to resolve the Iraq crisis. The chapter reviews the internal 
discussions in four Eastern European countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Poland – 
and why each of these countries decided to support the U.S. view on the Iraq crisis. 
Chapter IV analyzes the consequences for NATO and the EU of the policies of 
the Eastern European countries regarding the Iraq crisis. The chapter evaluates various 
factors that may influence the development of these organizations from the perspective of 
the Eastern European countries.  
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Chapter V presents conclusions concerning Eastern European reactions to the Iraq 
crisis. The chapter summarizes findings about the implications of Eastern European 
policies for transatlantic relations. 
 4
II. THE IRAQ CRISIS 
A. HOW THE CRISIS EMERGED 
UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, set the cease-fire 
terms after the U.S.-led coalition liberated Kuwait, which had been occupied by Iraq in 
August 1990. The resolution stipulated that “Iraq shall unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless” of all its weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missiles. It also prohibited Iraq’s acquisition of any nuclear materials and 
established “the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance.”6 
Nevertheless, in subsequent years the UN Security Council approved a series of 
new resolutions (707, 715, 986, 1154, 1284 and 1409) that dealt with Iraq’s non-
compliance and hampering of inspections. Finally, on 16 December 1998 (before the U.S. 
and British governments carried out air strikes for three days) weapons inspectors left 
Iraq with many unanswered questions and pronounced their work in Iraq incomplete. In 
answer to that, however, Iraq declared the work of the weapons inspectors finished.7 
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 all European governments 
condemned the terrorists and expressed support for the United States war against the 
organizers of the 11 September 2001 attacks – the Al Qaeda terrorist network, which was 
sheltered by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The French and German governments 
and several other governments sent military forces to Afghanistan.8 However, the United 
States  chose  to  fight  this  war  without  official  NATO  involvement  beyond the eight 
                                                 
6 UN Security Council Resolution 687 is available at http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm [15 April 
2003] 
7 “Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections And an Assessment of Their Accomplishments, 1990-2002,” Arms 
Control Association, Arms Control Today, October 2002, available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/iraqspecialoct02.asp [15 November 2003] 
8 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003, available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
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measures approved by the North Atlantic Council in October 2001.9 Many NATO 
countries became members of the U.S.-led coalition, arranging their participation on a 
bilateral basis. 
Further friction on global security issues in the transatlantic community arose on 
29 January 2002, when the United States President described Iraq, Iran and North Korea 
as an “axis of evil.”10 U.S. President George W. Bush stated that “America will do all 
that is necessary to ensure our nation’s security.”11 
The President’s inclusion of Iraq in the “axis of evil” was consistent with the U.S. 
administration’s policy demanding rapid international actions to ensure that Iraq would 
not develop WMD in the future.  
On 12 September 2002, the President of the United States delivered a speech at 
the United Nations calling upon its member states to make sure that “the Security Council 
resolutions will be enforced” and warning that “the United States of America will make 
that stand.”12 Consequently, the United States continued its diplomatic efforts to persuade 
the UN Security Council members of the urgent need to address the Iraq crisis by all 
means necessary.  On 16 September 2002, Iraq agreed to accept (for the first time since 
1998) the return of weapons inspectors “without conditions.”13 On 2 October 2002, the 
U.S. Congress approved the use of military force if Iraq would not peacefully disarm.14  
                                                 
9 States Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council 
Decision On Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the 
United States, 4 October 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm [15 April 2003]  
10 “The President's State of the Union Address,” Office of the Press Secretary, 29 January 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html [15 November 2003] 
11 “The President's State of the Union Address,” Office of the Press Secretary, 29 January 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html [15 November 2003] 
12 “President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” Office of the Press Secretary, 12 September 
2002 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html [15 November 2003] 
13 “Iraq Agrees To Weapons Inspections,” CNN.com, 17 September 2002, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/16/iraq.un.letter/ [15 November 2003] 
14 Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html [15 November 2003] 
 6
It seemed for a while that differences had been overcome when, after a month of 
diplomatic discussions, the UN Security Council on 8 November 2003 approved 
Resolution 1441 by a vote of 15-0.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 demanded that Iraq ensure an “accurate, 
full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery systems.” 
Additionally, it required Iraq to cooperate fully and unconditionally with inspectors from 
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.15 
In some countries (including the United States) the resolution was regarded as a 
final opportunity for Iraq to disarm.16 This approach was reaffirmed at NATO’s 
November 2002 Prague summit. In addition to making decisions on enlargement, the 
launching of the NATO Response Force project, and the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment, the NATO Allies underlined their common desire to resolve the Iraq 
crisis.17   
Nevertheless, the weapons inspectors in Iraq were not able to deliver a rapid, 
decisive and compelling statement about the existence of WMD in Iraq. Some countries 
shared the U.S. administration’s view that Iraq’s behavior was intended to buy time and 
to hide Baghdad’s real intentions. Accordingly, the next dispute between UN Security 
Council members arose concerning the legally correct interpretation of the Resolution 
1441 commitments. Different interpretations appeared about the consequences in case of 
Iraq’s non-compliance with Resolution 1441.18  
The United States insisted that the reference to “serious consequences” in the 
resolution would mean military action. The United States noted that Iraq had had 11 
                                                 
15Resolution 1441 is available at http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm [15 April 2003] 
16 “Senators Welcome Support on Iraq from 18 European Countries,” U.S. Department Of State, International 
Information Programs, 11 February 2003 available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03021202.htm [15 
November 2003] 
17 NATO’s Prague Summit Statement on Iraq is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-133e.htm [15 
November 2003] 
18 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
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years to disarm,19 but that Iraq had not clearly decided give up its weapons programs 
even since the UN Security Council had approved Resolution 1441. Iraq’s non-
cooperation with weapons inspectors was interpreted by the United States as a breach of 
the resolution. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, said, “It is 
incumbent upon Iraq to cooperate fully and pro-actively as soon as possible with the 
inspection regime. ... For it not to do so constitutes the loss of a very, very important 
opportunity to resolve this matter by peaceful means. And if it is not resolved by peaceful 
means, the responsibility will fall fully upon the shoulders of Iraq.”20  
At the same time Belgium, France, and Germany offered their own interpretation 
of the resolution, arguing that Iraq’s unwillingness to reveal more about its WMD 
programs would not necessarily constitute a justification for war (casus belli). They 
recommended that the UN weapons inspections be expanded and saw no reason to 
discuss an immediate timetable for military action.21 
This second approach to the resolution of the Iraq crisis was accepted not only by 
the governments of Belgium, France, and Germany. Enhanced measures for the 
containment of the Iraq crisis without war were endorsed by the overwhelming majority 
of public opinion in Europe. Moreover, in March 2003 Europe witnessed a series of large 
anti-war demonstrations.22 Russia and China (both permanent members of the UN 
Security Council) also insisted that war with Iraq was not justified and proposed that 
more intense diplomatic pressure and arms inspections be used in relations with Iraq.23 
                                                 
19 “President Bush Discusses Iraq,” Office of the Press Secretary, 14 January 2003, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030114-2.html [15 April 2003] 
20 Negroponte quoted in Judy Aita, “Iraq in “Further Material Breach” of U.N. Resolution, U.S. Says,” 
Washington File Staff Writer, 9 January 2003, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/03010903.htm 
[15 November 2003] 
21 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
22 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
23“Western Leaders' Iraq Rift Grows,” CNN.com, 23 January 2003 available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/23/sprj.irq.europe.rumsfeld/index.html [15 November 2003] 
 8
The public opinion polls even in historically strongly pro-American countries 
were unexpectedly negative. 84% in Britain, 80% in the Netherlands, 75% in Poland and 
over 90% in Turkey opposed the U.S. policy concerning the Iraq crisis.24  
Because of this public pressure to use military means only in accordance with a 
certain interpretation of international law (that is, with an additional UN Security Council 
authorization for the use of force), the main U.S. ally during the Iraq crisis – the British 
government – proposed another UN Security Council resolution. However, after 
unsuccessful attempts to gather sufficient support from the UN Security Council 
countries, the proposed new resolution stating that the UN Security Council was 
“determined to secure full compliance with its decisions and to restore international peace 
and security in the area”25 was removed from the agenda, and the U.S.-led coalition 
based its actions on the legal ground furnished by previous resolutions.26 
 
B. THE TRANSATLANTIC DIPLOMACY IN 2002-2003 
In August 2002, the U.S. government raised strong arguments about the need to 
replace the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. These arguments were generally not 
welcomed in Europe. The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, announced in his 
election campaign in September 2002 that “Under my leadership, Germany will not take 
part in an intervention in Iraq.”27 France also expressed reservations about bringing about 
regime change in Iraq by military means. The British government, however, supported 
the U.S. position on the Iraq crisis. European countries started to form two competing 
camps. The countries supporting the U.S. policy included Britain, Denmark, Italy, the 
                                                 
24 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
25 First Britain, Spain and the United States Draft Resolution:  24 February 2003 available at 
http://www.un.int/usa/scdraft-iraq-2-24-03 [15 November 2003] and Second United Nations Draft Resolution tabled by 
Britain, Spain and the United States, 7 March 2003 available at 
http://www.iraqcrisis.co.uk/resources.php?idtag=R3E706B6DB7EC7 [15 November 2003] 
26 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [15 November 2003] 
27 Schroeder quoted in “A News Hour With Jim Lehrer Transcript, Background: Germany,” Online News Hour, 
23 September 2002, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec02/bkgdgermany_9-23.html [15 
November 2003] 
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Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain; and the countries that opposed the U.S. policy included 
Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg.28  
Inevitably the controversy dividing the Western countries on the settlement of the 
Iraq crisis spilled over into the main international organizations. The Iraq crisis seriously 
affected the EU, NATO and the UN. Some observers argue that UN Security Council 
authority was diminished because the war was conducted without an additional resolution 
explicitly authorizing the use of force. As noted in Chapter IV of this thesis, it can be 
argued that NATO lost part of its credibility as a reliable security guarantor in the eyes of 
some countries in February 2003, owing to the dispute about deciding to take measures to 
protect Turkey. As a result, flexible coalitions of the willing have been mentioned as 
preferred future security cooperation frameworks by some politicians.  The EU 
declarations on the future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were seriously 
undermined during the Iraq crisis, because bilateral relations and national interests 
seemed to play a more important role than the wish to pursue a common European Union 
policy. 
One may argue that the EU countries reached a consensus on 17 February 2003, 
when they agreed on certain points concerning the Iraq crisis.29 The ambiguous EU 
Council statement on Iraq on 17 February 2003 asked Baghdad to disarm “immediately 
and fully…. Force should only be used as a last resort. It is for the Iraqi regime to end 
this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council.”30 
However, the common declaration of the EU Summit on 17 February 2003 left 
the question of timing unresolved.31 According to The Economist, the EU view that the 
UN weapons inspectors must be given “the time and resources the UN Security Council 
                                                 
28 “More Divided Than Ever,” El Pais, 25 March 2003, available at 
http://store.yahoo.com/expandnato/nedbmar03.html [10 May 2003] 
29 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/councils/bx20030217/index_en.htm [10 May 2003] 
 30EU Council statement quoted in Richard Bernstein, “EU Says Iraq Must Disarm Quickly And Fully,” New 
York Times, 18 February 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20030219wednesday.html [10 May 2003], available at  
Full text of The Eu Council’s Statement On Iraq - http://europa.eu.int/comm/councils/bx20030217/index_en.htm [10 
May 2003] 
31 “United In Theory, Divided In Practice,” The Economist, 20 February 2003, available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [10 November 2003] 
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believes that they need” was “a sop to the Franco-German position,” while the EU 
statement that “inspections cannot continue indefinitely” was “a nod to the Spanish-
British position.”32 Additionally, the two previously published open letters by the heads 
of eighteen European governments clearly indicated the rift in Europe.33 
As the Iraq crisis evolved and the transatlantic rift deepened, NATO became the 
next victim of political controversy. Although the United States in 2001 did not ask 
NATO to play a major role in the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, in late 
2002 the United States asked the NATO Allies to take precautionary measures in support 
of Turkey’s defense in case of military action by Iraq. The culmination of the crisis in 
NATO came on 10 February 2003, when Belgium, France and Germany broke the 
silence procedure (that is, blocked the decision) to endorse the “prudent contingency 
planning to deter or defend against a possible threat to Turkey”34 that would consist of 
indirect military support including the deployment of Patriot missiles and AWACS 
aircraft.  These three governments argued that such a NATO decision would be wrong, 
because it would imply that war was inevitable. The question of support to Turkey was an 
excellent example of how strained transatlantic relations can spill into other areas.35 This 
event played into the hands of the skeptics about NATO’s reliability as a security 
guarantor.  
The NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, tried to smooth over the crisis 
within the Alliance by arguing that “The question still is not ‘if’ but ‘when.’”36 He added 
                                                 
32 “United in Theory, Divided in Practice,” The Economist, 20 February 2003, available at 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MewBkd/message/2266 [10 November 2003] 
33 The first letter, released on 30 January 2003, was endorsed by Britain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, and is available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03013007.htm [15 April 
2003]. The second letter, released on 5 February 2003, was endorsed by Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, the 
FYROM, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia and is available at 
http://www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Iraq/Feb0503VilniusIraq.html [10 November 2003]. 
34 Press statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030210a.htm [10 April 2003] 
35 Philip Gordon, “The Crisis In The Alliance,” 24 February 2003 available at 
http://dkuk.wz.cz/ResearchPack/iraq.pdf [10 November 2003] 
36 Press statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030210a.htm [10 November 2003] 
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that “There is a disagreement on timing at the moment by a small number of nations, but 
there is no disagreement on substance at all.”37 
However, the U.S. President commented that he was “disappointed” with the 
activities in NATO. 38 Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
criticized Belgium, France and Germany as “problem” countries for keeping “NATO 
from fulfilling its obligation.”39  
To explain their positions Belgium, France and Germany stated that they were 
ready to honor their North Atlantic Treaty commitments, but that at that moment any 
military preparations would send the wrong signal about the prospects for a diplomatic 
solution. In the words of the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, “War may never be 
considered unavoidable. ... Everything must be done to achieve the implementation of the 
(U.N.) resolution by peaceful means. That is the common position of France and 
Germany and we will not be diverted from it.”40 These countries insisted that an 
immediate war with Iraq would not be wise and that UN arms inspectors should be given 
more time.41 They suggested that all political possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis be completely exhausted before going to war with Iraq. 
In the development of the Iraq crisis, Germany played an important role. In 
contrast to France’s traditional Gaullist foreign policy, Germany shifted from its 
traditional role of being a mediator between the United States and France. In the Iraq 
crisis Germany took a position similar to that of France in certain respects. 
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The decision by the German Chancellor to rule out any German participation in 
any eventual use of force against Iraq in the September 2002 election campaign rapidly 
led to an erosion of relations between the political leaders of the United States and 
Germany.42  
At the end of 2002 the Eastern European countries, many of which just had 
received invitations at the NATO Prague Summit and the EU Copenhagen Summit to 
join these organizations, got involved in the serious controversies between leading 
European countries and the United States. During the next several months the Eastern 
European countries faced a difficult political task – to pursue their national security 
policy interests (including the successful functioning of the enlarged NATO and the 
enlarged EU), to avoid antagonizing the major powers, and to keep in touch with their 
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III. SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN EXAMPLES  
In order to explain Eastern European behavior regarding the Iraq crisis, it is 
necessary first of all to clarify the determinants of Eastern European security policies, 
notably with respect to the United States. 
All Eastern European countries see the best guarantee of their national security in 
close cooperation with strong external powers. None of the Eastern European countries 
can prudently rely only on its own capabilities to meet its national security requirements. 
According to the President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, “In our history, we have 
learned that our only chance for real security is standing with our allies, and hoping they 
will stand by us.”43 
Eastern European countries see the possible accomplishment of this aim only in 
strategic partnership with the United States. For this reason it is important to maintain 
solid U.S. involvement in an enlarged NATO and in Europe. 
Eastern European countries generally agree that their security prospects would 
have a grim future without a strong U.S. presence in Eastern Europe. They would have to 
face growing Russian influence alone.44 All Eastern European countries have fresh and 
compelling memories of dominating Russian influence in the region in recent centuries, 
notably in the period 1940-1991. Russia will always be present in Eastern Europe, but the 
presence of Western powers may not be permanent.  
Despite various recent achievements regarding NATO and the EU, the value of 
the U.S. partnership and strong presence in NATO and Europe is still a common vital 
security policy priority for most Eastern European countries.  
Without significant U.S. assistance, Eastern European countries might find 
themselves in a hostage role, if they relied only on Western Europe for help in addressing 
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hard security challenges. Western European countries tend to see Russia as a source of 
energy, but Eastern European countries see Russia as the former hegemon with a history 
of 50 years of dominance (1940-1991) in the recent past. Eastern Europeans want to work 
with Western organizations, including NATO and the EU, to diminish the influence of 
the former master and to obtain the capacity to pursue a dialogue with greater confidence 
in their security. How can Eastern European countries rely on France and Germany in 
questions of hard security, when as recently as 2001 these countries, for their own 
reasons (concern about relations with Russia in Germany’s case,45 an interest in 
European Union defense and security autonomy in France’s case46) hesitated to support 
large-scale NATO enlargement?  Eastern European countries remember well that the 
United States was the main advocate of NATO enlargement after 1999 and judge that, if 
not for the United States, for many of them NATO membership would still be a long-
term future prospect.47  President George W. Bush in his speech in Warsaw on 21 June 
2001 for the first time outlined the U.S. policy favoring a robust NATO enlargement 
“from the Baltics to the Black Sea.”48 The new vision made obsolete the previous view 
that only one to four countries might be invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit. The 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and America’s leading role in the fight against 
terrorism reinforced the view that NATO must include countries that would be valuable 
allies in facing new kinds of threats.49 
Eastern European countries also see the United States as the main force that 
liberated them from Soviet dominance and as the key factor in their successful inclusion 
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in NATO – the defense community of the Western democracies.50 This historical 
experience has led Eastern European countries to support U.S. leadership in meeting the 
challenges of the 21st century.51  
The European Union, despite its close proximity to Eastern Europe, did not 
approve EU enlargement until it was clear that seven additional Eastern European 
countries would become part of the security area under the NATO collective defense 
umbrella.52 NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the Alliance 
at the July 1997 Madrid summit. NATO invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the Alliance at the November 2002 Prague 
Summit. The NATO membership process for these seven countries is expected to be 
complete in May 2004. During the same month the EU is to admit ten new members: the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia.  
At present, Eastern European countries continue to regard the United States as the 
most reliable force in hard security matters and consider the EU’s military value as 
virtual at best. 53  
The Eastern European countries have profound doubts about the political as well 
as military ability of the EU to protect them in a crisis. Presently Eastern Europeans are 
afraid to put the future of their region’s security in the hands of the EU. Reliance on 
Western European countries for security has not worked well for most Eastern European 
countries since the Middle Ages. As Martin Wight observed, 
Western Europe, in the farthest extremities of the European peninsula, was 
sheltered and insulated by Eastern Europe, whose history was punctuated 
by the flow of invasions from the east and their reflux from the west. . . . 
Within the lifetime of Christendom Western Europe had been sheltered 
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from the onslaughts of the Mongols and the Turks, because Eastern 
Europe had taken the brunt of them; and the Tatar invasion governed the 
historical development of Russia as the Turkish invasion governed the 
historical development of the Balkans and the Danubian basin.54 
Moreover, in the first half of the twentieth century, East European nations 
(including Czechoslovakia and Poland) found West European nations (notably Britain 
and France) to be unreliable security guarantors. Eastern European nations during the 
interwar period lacked full independence in relation to the leading powers of the League 
of Nations. In Martin Wight’s words,  
This failure to attain effective independence was with the Eastern 
European states from the beginning.  They had come into existence under 
a kind of tutelage, not only political but juridical as well.  For all of them 
were compelled to accept international obligations, supervised by the 
League of Nations, for the treatment of their minorities.   This system of 
international servitude was confined to the states of Eastern Europe.  It 
was intensely resented, partly as an infringement of the new-won 
sovereignty, and particularly because the Great Powers were exempted 
from it.55 
How were policies concerning the Iraq crisis set in Eastern European countries? 
How important a place did the Iraq crisis take in Eastern European political debates? 
How were the Saddam Hussein regime and international terrorism seen in Eastern 
European countries? Were they seen as direct or indirect threats to security in Eastern 
Europe? To what extent does the former hegemon Russia still play a major role in the 
setting of security policy priorities in Eastern Europe? What are the roles of the 
authoritarian regime in Belarus and of the violent heritage of the Balkan region in the 
Eastern European security agenda? 
Eastern European countries have enjoyed democracy and freedom only since the 
fall of Communist governments in 1989-1991, and people still remember the non-
democratic regimes. Are Eastern European security policies based on values and threat 
assessments different from those in Western Europe? Are moral arguments more decisive 
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in Eastern Europe, at least in comparison to Western European “pacifist” or “realist” 
approaches? Are moral arguments especially strong in Eastern Europe regarding values 
such as the necessity of using force against dictatorships and the ineffectiveness of an 
“appeasement” policy? 
According to Adrian Nastase, the Romanian Prime Minister, “For us it was 
important to decide not whether we were with Europe or America but what kind of values 
we are supporting. It was clear for us because of our background, because of our striving 
against dictatorship.”56 
Finally, does the disposition to support the United States derive from gratitude for 
recently re-obtained freedom as well as a judgment that the United States is the only 
reliable guarantor for Eastern European security in the event that hostile powers re-
emerge? 57  
Eastern European countries currently have similar but not identical security 
situations. Status as a candidate, invitee or member of NATO and the EU tends to 
determine the security policy priorities of Eastern European countries. These countries 
can be divided into four groups: 
• NATO members and EU invitees – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. 
• NATO and EU invitees – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
• NATO invitees and EU candidates – Bulgaria and Romania. 
• NATO and EU candidates – Albania, Croatia, and FYROM. 
Nevertheless, all of these Eastern European countries, despite their different 
backgrounds, came together in supporting the same position concerning relations with the 
United States and the U.S. policy in the Iraq crisis in 2002-2003.  
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To clarify these countries’ common features and differences in security 
perceptions, the specific case studies examine the policies of the following countries – 
Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Poland. Each of these four countries represents one of the 
four groups noted above. 
 
A. POLAND 
Poland has made a decisive turn away from its historical security policy dilemma. 
The decision to align itself with Russia, Germany, or France on numerous occasions led 
to the loss of independence. Warsaw has now chosen reliance on the strongest country in 
international politics – the United States.58 The editor in chief of Poland’s Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Adam Michnik, gave the following definition of the nation’s security 
orientation: “Poland's future is in the EU, but its security is in the United States.”59 
Poland’s pro-American policy orientation first attracted public attention in the 
second half of 2002, when Poland chose to purchase American F-16 fighter aircraft in the 
biggest Eastern European weapons deal to date. However, the Iraq crisis in late 2002 and 
early 2003 further clarified Poland’s security policy priorities. 
Moreover, the Polish government has emerged from the Iraq crisis as one of 
America’s most trusted new allies in Europe.60  Poland was entrusted with responsibility 
for one of the sectors in post-war Iraq. Poland’s political weight has significantly 
increased, and it has gained in international stature as a leading power in Eastern 
Europe.61 With a population of about 40 million (half of the population of the ten 
countries that will become members of the EU in May 2004), Poland may become one of 
the most influential European powers. Jerzy Nowak, Poland's ambassador to NATO, 
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described the new Poland’s leadership potential as follows:  “For the first time in our 
history we will be among powers that would decide the destiny of a specific country and 
a specific problem.”62  
The United States also regards Poland as one of the key players in global politics. 
On 30 October 2003 the U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Christopher Hill, noted that Poland 
“has a historical right to be a part of the decision making process that shapes the 
continent.”63 Furthermore, a statement by the President of the United States, George W. 
Bush, highlighted the seriousness of the maturing partnership between Poland and the 
United States: “Poland is the best friend of the United States in Europe.”64 Some 
commentators even argue that after the Iraq crisis Poland had taken the position of the 
most loyal and pro-American European continental country from Germany.65 
Notwithstanding the Polish fixation on the United States in security matters, 
Poland is also willing to serve as a bridge to mend the transatlantic rift caused by the Iraq 
crisis. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski characterized this position as follows: 
“We are happy that today we are very close partners with the USA, but we also know the 
importance of Germany and France in the world.”66   
On 20 March 2003, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, as head of 
the armed forces, approved the Polish army’s participation in the war in Iraq. He justified 
this decision by noting that Iraq had refused to comply with UN Security Council 
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Resolution 1441 and by pointing out that the coalition of willing could not “abandon 
moves designed to efficiently disarm Iraq.”67 
The Polish special forces unit “Grom” was the only Eastern European military 
unit directly involved in the combat in Iraq. Besides this commando unit, the Polish 
contingent included a decontamination platoon and a logistic support ship.68 
Public opinion in Poland was generally against the war in Iraq.69 Even though the 
intervening powers (Australia, Britain, Poland, and the United States) asserted that their 
action was justified by existing UN Security Council mandates, the majority of the public 
still perceived it negatively. Several anti-war demonstrations took place in the major 
cities of Poland in February and March 2003. However, the level of participation in anti-
war protests was lower than in Western European countries.70 The active demonstrators 
consisted principally of people from nongovernmental organizations with leftist and 
pacifist orientations.71 Their main proclamation was that the Polish government had 
ignored the opinion of the masses that were against the war in Iraq.72 They condemned 
U.S. foreign policy as driven by economic interests73 and accused the Polish government 
of serving as a puppet for the United States.  
Nevertheless, the government’s stand on the Iraq crisis will probably not play a 
major role in the next elections. Events in the Middle East and the Iraq crisis debate itself 
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seem relatively distant and overshadowed by national issues, including high 
unemployment and economic changes associated with entering the EU.74 
 
B. LATVIA 
In 2002 Latvia achieved both of its main security policy priorities – invitations to 
join NATO and the EU. During his post-Prague Summit visit to Lithuania the U.S. 
President opened a new chapter in the history of many Eastern European countries with 
this statement: “Our Alliance has made a solemn pledge of protection, and anyone who 
would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of 
America. (Applause.) In the face of aggression, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia will never again stand alone.”75 In the words of Stephen Larrabee, an expert with 
the Rand Corporation, the invitations to the alliance once and for all “help to anchor the 
Baltic states into the Western community and end the debate about their security 
orientation.”76 
Taking into account its relative geographical remoteness and small size, Latvia 
remains highly interested in the strategic partnership with the United States. Latvian 
political leaders recognize that, if the United States had not played a leading role in 
NATO enlargement despite Russian disapproval, the “red line” that Moscow tried to 
stipulate as a limit on NATO enlargement could still be drawn.77 According to the 
National Defence Concept of the Republic of Latvia, “The support of the United States of 
America  in  the  strengthening and achievement of the independence and security of the 
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Baltic States was and will be a deciding factor. Therefore, also in the future, co-operation 
with the United States of America will be one of Latvia's defence policy bilateral relation 
priorities.”78 
On 5 February 2003, Latvia was one of the ten Eastern European countries that 
announced support for the U.S. position regarding the Iraq crisis. Sandra Kalniete, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, explained the nation’s position: 
“The Latvian public needs to understand that we cannot stand by and hope that nobody 
threatens us because we threaten nobody… The noble meaning of solidarity and the 
responsibilities of an ally become particularly understandable when one sees the 
unending lines of white crosses in the graveyards of fallen American soldiers in 
Normandy.”79 
On 20 March 2003, the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia took a decision “On 
the Support of the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1441.” The 
decision stated Latvia’s readiness to assist in the international coalition’s endeavors to 
disarm the Iraq regime.80 The Prime Minister of Latvia, Einars Repse, stated the reason 
why Latvia had to be involved in the Iraq crisis in the following words: “This is an 
important moment for us to prove we are not a small, scared country, but one that can 
stand up and take part in collective international security.”81 In terms of military 
assistance, Latvia provided about 150 military personnel (cargo specialists, military 
police, unexploded ordinance experts and peacekeepers) to the post-combat rehabilitation 
phase in Iraq.  
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Despite the fact that public opinion polls indicated that about 75% of Latvians 
were against the war in Iraq,82 the Latvian government implemented its previously 
formulated policy. The foreign policy advisor of the Latvian Prime Minister, Solveiga 
Silkalna, explained to Agence France-Presse the government’s position: “Our experience 
here (in the ex-Soviet Baltic states) means we are telling people: remember how it was 
for us when we were under a dictatorship. Wouldn't we have liked someone to help us.”83 
Critics of the Latvian government’s pro-American policy underlined what they 
deemed a lack of sufficient legal justification for the war in Iraq. They doubted the 
usefulness and necessity of Latvia’s declared readiness to get involved in Iraq’s 
disarmament and deplored what they considered a rushed decision that could lead to 
long-term entanglement in guerrilla warfare in Iraq. The protestors in the small street 
demonstrations in Latvia chiefly consisted of representatives from liberal cultural circles 
and leftist political organizations.84  
The official political opposition emphasized that the decision to actively support 
the United States could undermine relations with France and Germany and that the 
government decision had been taken in defiance of the will of the majority of the Latvian 
people who opposed the war in Iraq.85 
 
C. BULGARIA 
Bulgarian public opinion on the Iraq crisis was divided. Critics of the U.S. policy 
opposed war against the Saddam Hussein regime and accused the Bulgarian government 
of blind and unconditional obedience to the world superpower. The Bulgarian president, 
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Georgi Parvanov, denounced the possibility of war without explicit United Nations 
Security Council approval as a violation of international law.86 
Supporters of U.S. policy regarded the actions taken by the United States as an 
investment in future international stability that would benefit Bulgaria’s national security. 
Despite some possible negative consequences, they held that Bulgaria should fully 
embrace the U.S. stance on the Iraq crisis.87 The Bulgarian government emphasized the 
fundamental values (tyranny versus freedom) at stake and strongly supported the U. S. 
policy in Iraq.88 The Foreign Minister, Solomon Passi, described this situation as follows: 
“just things are not always popular and popular things are not always just.”89 
In March 2003 about 1,000 people went to the streets in eastern Bulgaria in an 
anti-war demonstration organized by the Socialist Party (the only party in parliament to 
oppose the government’s pro-American policy).90 Although the majority of the 
population opposed the war in Iraq, the nation-wide protest campaign was relatively 
small. The economic situation of the country, not the war in Iraq, is the central problem 
for many Bulgarians.91  
For the practical military side, Bulgaria allowed overflight and transit rights for 
the U.S.-led coalition troops, provided airports for U.S. aircraft (six U.S. Air Force KC10 
Extender refueling aircraft and logistic support personnel operated from the airports in 
Sarafovo and Burgas), and deployed its 100-member nuclear, chemical and biological 
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protection unit.92 During Operation Enduring Freedom U.S. transport aircraft were hosted 
in Bulgaria and 150 U.S. military personnel worked on the ground.93 
Bulgaria could also be categorized as one of the few Eastern European countries 
which could expect direct consequences from the war in Iraq. Because it hosted 
temporary U.S. military bases, the Bulgarian government had to deal with the security 
question of the U.S. troops.  The Iraqi chargé d'affaires in Sofia, Jahia Mahdi, announced 
that all U.S. military bases would become targets if United States forces entered Iraq.94 
The security of the strategically significant infrastructure in Bulgaria was reinforced and 
security procedures around the foreign diplomatic missions were tightened as the war 
started.95 Extra precautionary measures also were taken to secure the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border against a possible massive flow of refugees. The Interior Minister, Georgi 
Petkanov, characterized the security elevation process as follows: “Bulgaria has not been 
threatened by terrorists so far but we have taken all precautions.”96  
 
D. ALBANIA 
Despite the fact that Albania was not invited to join NATO at the Alliance’s 
Prague Summit in November 2002, the United States undoubtedly remains Tirana’s main 
partner in security issues.97 The United States also has made clear that the NATO 
enlargement process did not end with the Prague Summit and that the Alliance’s door 
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remains open for those South-Eastern European countries that are ready to undertake the 
preparations necessary for membership.98 
The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, noted that he and his Albanian 
counterpart had discussed “our joint interest in having Albania proceed along the path 
towards full NATO membership over the years ahead. In the meantime, the United States 
looks forward to working closely on a bilateral basis with cooperative military-to-military 
relationships as we work toward that end.”99 
The Albanian Defense Minister, Pandeli Majko, noted that Albania “has lined up 
alongside the United States in the global challenge of our times -- the fight against 
terrorism and the dictatorial regimes…Albania considers the full and de jure membership 
of our country in NATO as a priority objective, a collective aspiration, and an imminent 
reality as well.”100 
The main reason for the popularity of the United States and NATO in Albania 
resides in the fact that the majority of Albanians regard the United States with gratitude 
because of the U.S.-led 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslav military operations 
against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.101 Consequently Albanian 
political parties agree that the United States is the country’s strategic partner and that 
NATO is the organization to secure its sovereignty.102 After having witnessed the wars in 
their Balkan neighborhood throughout the 1990s, Albanians esteem highly the military 
protection that can be offered by the United States and NATO. 
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The Albanian Minister of Defense, Pandeli Majko, characterized this Albanian 
attitude as follows: “The United States stood on the side of the Albanian nation in 1999, 
when even the existence of our nation was at stake… Our gratitude will be very 
lasting.”103 
The Albanian public’s perception of U.S. policy regarding the Iraq crisis is also 
noteworthy.  Although Albania’s population is more than 70% Muslim, in contrast with 
many other Muslim countries, the Albanian people expressed a high level of sympathy 
for U.S. policy.104 Albania is recognized as one of the most pro-American states in 
world.105 In contrast with the other Eastern and Western European countries, in March 
2003 there was not a single demonstration against the Iraq war in Albania.106 
The Albanian parliament in March 2003 approved the opening of air and naval 
bases for the coalition forces.107 Moreover, the Albanian government sent a 70-man 
military unit to post-Saddam Iraq for peacekeeping activities. The Albanian armed forces 
have already participated in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan.108 
 
E. SUMMARY 
Although a majority of the Eastern Europeans opposed the U.S.-led military 
intervention in Iraq, many were reluctant to protest against U.S. policy, given that just a 
decade ago they were liberated when the United States won the Cold War. Moreover, as 
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noted earlier, seven Eastern European countries were in November 2002 invited to 
become part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.109 
The traditional anti-Americanism of Western Europe is a relatively new 
phenomenon in Eastern Europe. The free market economy has been developing in 
Eastern Europe since 1989-1991, and economic growth in recent years has fostered 
support for the U.S. economic model. Many Eastern Europeans still see the United States 
as the genuine “global human rights and freedom fighter” that liberated Eastern Europe 
and that now is pursuing the same mission in other regions. For example, Mircea Geoana, 
Foreign Minister of Romania, said in September 2003 with regard to NATO that “Our 
task is to democratise, modernise and bring prosperity to the nations of the Middle East, 
Afghanistan and Central Asia.”110 
Many people in Eastern European countries have been reluctant to get involved in 
a country which seems far away,111 but many local political authorities have reminded 
them that the Eastern European countries themselves could be described in the same way 
– as suffering people in a remote area – just a decade ago. Eastern Europeans remember 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s abandonment of Czechoslovakia at the 
September 1938 Munich conference.  Chamberlain told the British people:  
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches 
and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country 
between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible 
that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the 
subject of war.112 
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The bottom-line is that Eastern Europeans judge that the United States won the 
Cold War, liberated Eastern Europe from Soviet tutelage, and laid the foundations for a 
future Europe – whole and free.113 
Therefore, in Eastern Europe strong anti-Americanism remains a feature of the 
politically extreme left (including the communists) and of the extreme right (various 
nationalists). Furthermore, for many Eastern European countries the prospect of France 
and Germany expanding their influence in Europe is of much greater concern than U.S. 
unilateralist trends in world affairs.114   
Although a majority of the public in Eastern Europe opposed the looming war in 
Iraq in March 2003, when millions of people marched through the streets of Western 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN POSITIONS 
CONCERNING THE IRAQ CRISIS 
A. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
NATO has successfully survived many crises – the Anglo-French attempt to seize 
the Suez Canal in 1956, France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure 
in 1966 (and the simultaneous relocation of the U.S. forces and the NATO headquarters), 
and the controversy concerning U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the early 
1980s. The recent disputes have much to do not only with the Iraq crisis, but also with the 
future of NATO.116  
To what extent could the Iraq crisis and the disputes between the United Kingdom 
and the United States on one side, and France and Germany on the other, directly or 
indirectly jeopardize the credibility and future of the two international organizations – 
NATO and the EU – which are the main priorities of the Eastern European countries’ 
security policies? 
 
1. The Article 5 Controversy 
For the Eastern European countries NATO’s assistance to Turkey in the Iraq crisis 
was of major importance. The Eastern European countries are interested in not allowing 
any flexible interpretation of Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Any loose 
interpretation set by unwise precedents would mean a decrease of the Eastern European 
countries’ confidence in their security. It should be recalled that Article 4 concerns 
security consultations and that Article 5 consists of the mutual defense pledge of the 
Allies. 
4. The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of 
them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of 
the Parties is threatened. 
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5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.117 
As Nikolas Gvosdev, the editor of In The National Interest, has asked, “If some 
members of the alliance balk at providing assistance to a fellow ally who feels itself to be 
under threat, in this case from Iraq, are the Article 4 and 5 guarantees really worth the 
parchment on which they are written?”118  
Events associated with Turkey’s request for NATO support sent significant 
signals to Eastern European countries already in NATO and to other countries in Eastern 
Europe.  
According to Ernest Skalski, the leading political and economic commentator for 
Poland’s Gazeta Wyborcza, “And particularly unacceptable is a situation where Turkey, a 
NATO member, asks for support provided for in the NATO treaty and does not receive 
such support immediately and without any pre-conditions from all other members.” 119 In 
the event, the assistance for Turkey was approved on 16 February 2003 by NATO’s 
Defense Planning Committee, a body in which France chooses not to participate. Lord 
Robertson commented that “we would have preferred to have a decision by the North 
Atlantic Council with all 19 members present. France is by its own choice not a member 
of the integrated military structure, and therefore not a member of the Defence Planning 
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Committee….But today was a remarkable day with an important decision and a very firm 
and clear signal by the Alliance that we will stand by an Ally if that Ally is under 
threat.”120 
If an Ally that feels threatened receives commitments from NATO only after such 
an arrangement is made, the question of NATO’s credibility as a collective defense 
institution arises. The Alliance successfully guarded Western Europe from Soviet 
invasion during the Cold War based on the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 
obligations.121 
Furthermore, some Eastern Europeans have expressed concern that, if France or 
Germany can veto NATO planning for assistance to Turkey, it is possible that the 
response to a potential Russian threat to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland could be 
even more reserved.122 
Turkey’s request for consultations in accordance with Article 4 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty was appropriate, because Article 4 is meant for use in exactly such crises. 
The consultation and mutual defense obligations are the fundamental reasons why 
Eastern European countries applied for NATO membership. If some Western European 
officials said that a prompt resort to Article 4 or 5 could send an undesirable message 
implying an irrevocable decision on war, and then denied use of air space and military 
installations for the potential support of the threatened country, Eastern European 
countries might feel that they could be left again to count on solely their own military 
strength.123  
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2. NATO “Out of Area Operations” 
The present events in post-war Iraq indicate the willingness of most Eastern 
European countries to take an active part in the peacekeeping mission in Iraq. This trend 
may promote the further expansion of NATO power projection towards operations 
focused on the Middle East and Central Asia (Afghanistan). This new direction could be 
especially highlighted with NATO’s positive response to Poland’s request for assistance 
in activities in its sector in Iraq. Similarly, since the mid-1990s all Eastern European 
countries have taken part in the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. Since December 
2001 several Eastern European countries have participated in the peacekeeping 
operations in Afghanistan, which have been officially led by NATO since August 
2003.124 Eastern European countries seem to be comparatively eager to participate in 
NATO “out of area” operations, and this factor may influence the further options of 
transforming NATO. 
 
3. NATO Involvement in Stabilizing Non-NATO Eastern Europe 
The membership of additional Eastern European countries in NATO may 
necessitate a new strategic agenda for this region. The purpose would be to ensure that 
the United States remains engaged in this region and that the credibility of Article 5 
commitments is strengthened.  Eastern European observers are concerned that the United 
States, being deeply involved in serious confrontations in the Middle East and East Asia, 
might decide to reduce its level of security cooperation with Eastern Europe.125  
NATO’s Eastern European countries can contribute to U.S. and NATO policies to 
improve the political situations in unstable regions through endeavors to stabilize and 
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cooperate with neighboring countries in non-NATO Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and 
Russia, with special attention to the Kaliningrad region.126 
After the Eastern European countries invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit 
gain full membership in the alliance in May 2004, one of the main future strategic tasks 
for these countries may well become the movement of the security zone further east, 
although this would not necessarily mean expanding membership in NATO. With NATO 
able to protect more countries directly and indirectly to the east, all present and 
prospective NATO members, including those in Eastern Europe, will feel more secure. 
The potential zone of instability will no longer be located directly at their borders. Good 
bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation programs among NATO and non-NATO 
Eastern European countries already exist.  
For example, just as Germany in the mid 1990s pushed for the accession of 
Poland to NATO, now Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia will push for a more important 
NATO role in relations with Belarus and Ukraine. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania will 
strongly support NATO cooperation programs regarding Moldova and the Balkans. All of 
these countries are also interested in contributing to the improvement of the security 
situation in the Caucasus. This strategy coincides with the EU, NATO and U.S. policies 
favoring stabilization of the Eastern European peripheries.127  
 
4. NATO Eastern European Military Capabilities 
Presently the military role of Eastern European countries in world affairs is quite 
restricted. For example, all the Eastern European countries combined could not provide 
military peacekeeping capabilities similar to those which Germany alone provided in 
Afghanistan. Germany and France are each militarily more advanced and capable than all 
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of the Eastern European countries together. Poland will manage one of the sectors in 
post-war Iraq, but a major part of the cost related to troop maintenance in this sector will 
be covered by the United States.128 
From the military point of view Eastern European countries offer a variety of 
relatively small and specialized niche contributions: chemical and biological protection 
units, peacekeeping, military police units, special operations forces, demining and 
explosive ordnance disposal units.129 
However, the United States is willing to intensify its political and military 
cooperation with the Eastern European countries in the post-Iraq war era. According to 
Krzysztof Bobinski, the editor of a Polish magazine on European integration, “The 
Americans have made a big effort to demonstrate that close links to them are easier, 
safer, more secure. That America can be relied on.”130 
Moreover, in the view of John Hulsman, a European policy analyst at the Heritage 
Foundation in Washington, “A lot of people here are looking for ways to help those 
countries that came along with us…. There’s brainstorming about how to help them [the 
Eastern European countries] – diplomatically and economically.”131 
Time will show how well-founded is the noteworthy judgment that “In the place 
of Germany and France, Mr. Bush has reached out to countries like Poland and Spain.”132 
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The answer will depend not only on the policies and capabilities of the Eastern European 
countries, but also on the development of relations between the Western European 
countries and the United States. 
Nevertheless some trends can be noted regarding relations between Eastern 
European countries and the United States. Obviously, the crisis over Iraq in late 
2002/early 2003 was profound, and the political and military consequences are expected 
to be significant. The Eastern European governments have spoken in support of U.S. 
policy, and the United States has taken the message seriously. U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld has noted that, “If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the 
center of gravity is shifting to the east.”133 
From a long-term strategic planning perspective the United States must try to 
seriously assist the development of Eastern European military capabilities over the next 
decade, if the U.S. government has decided to devote more attention to Eastern European 
countries. In the view of the Janusz Bugajski, the director of East European Studies at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, only in that case could Eastern European 
countries form a kind of alternative to France and Germany.134 An example of such long-
term strategic calculations may be evident in the U.S. government’s political and 
financial support for the Polish purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft.135 
It is significant in this regard that the Minister of Defence of the Republic of 
Latvia, Girts Valdis Kristovskis, declared that “it is clear that Latvia and the other Baltic 
States need a special support program to modernize our weapons and equipment to the 
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highest current standards. It is impossible to think that we will be able to participate in 
military operations with antiquated weapons and military transport!”136 
If uncooperative relations between the United States on one side and France and 
Germany on the other side continued in the post-Iraq crisis era, the United States might 
seriously reconsider its plans and redirect resources and attention to the new allies 
elsewhere in Europe.137 
The partial redeployment of U.S. troops from Western Europe to Eastern Europe 
would strengthen the Eastern European security situation, military capabilities, and 
defense infrastructure138 while also promoting economic development.139 Furthermore, 
the establishment of U.S. military bases in Eastern Europe would offer an extra guarantee 
of the allies’ protection provided by the North Atlantic Treaty. Such bases would have 
political as well as military value in that they could not be easily removed from Eastern 
Europe.140 
The problem that revealed itself during the U.S. preparations for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom when the United States could not use military installations in Turkey also has 
consequences for Eastern Europe’s strategic position. Eastern European countries could 
provide attractive alternatives in strategically relevant locations, with fewer risks of 
possible vetoes as a result of serious political backlashes.  Military bases, airfields and 
seaports in Eastern Europe (especially in Bulgaria and Romania) could enable U.S. forces 
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to monitor international developments and rapidly intervene, if necessary, in the 
Caucasus, Asia and the Middle East.141  
Finally, what could be a better impetus to move U.S. troops eastward than the fact 
that preceding and during the Iraq crisis Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania allowed U.S. 
forces to make their preparations or directly operate from bases on their soil?142 
While no final decisions have been made, many officials and experts expect U.S. 
troops to eventually shift eastwards. According to General James Jones, Commander of 
the U.S. European Command, “The NATO center of activities is now moving to Eastern 
Europe…. The United States must reconsider their strategy in light of the new allies.”143 
 
5. U.S. – Eastern European Relations 
Before the NATO enlargement plan was announced in Prague in November 2002, 
skeptics warned that a “big bang” expansion would bring to NATO a number of countries 
that would be strategically irrelevant, unable and reluctant to participate in NATO 
operations, and “freeriders” in defense spending. Events in NATO regarding the Iraq 
crisis proved, however, that Eastern European countries do not undermine NATO’s 
internal political cohesion and do not jeopardize the development of NATO antiterrorism 
policies.144 The opposition of Belgium, France and Germany in January-February 2003 
to beginning planning for some limited defensive measures to protect Turkey dismissed 
any doubt concerning the future reliability of the seven Eastern European countries 
invited to join NATO. The Eastern European countries behaved like de facto NATO 
members, and their consistent pro-American positions even helped NATO to avoid 
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further gaps in cohesion.145 The U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador 
R. Nicholas Burns, expressed confidence regarding the seven Eastern European countries 
invited to join NATO. In his view, they “would have supported aid to Turkey if they had 
been part of the deliberations. I would have liked to have had them at the table with us 
that week.”146 
The argument that the Eastern European countries supported the U.S. position 
because of the possibility that the U.S. Senate might block the ratification of NATO 
enlargement is invalid.147 First, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been 
members of NATO since 1999. Second, the U.S. Senate on 7 May 2003 ratified the 
accession of the seven new NATO member states, but all Eastern European countries 
have continued to support the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.  
Of course, the Eastern European countries’ pro-American stance regarding the 
Iraq crisis facilitated the U.S. Senate’s decision to approve NATO membership for seven 
additional countries.148 These countries were seen in a new light as valuable allies for the 
United States in world politics. During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
the implications of NATO’s eastward enlargement were characterized in a positive 
manner: 
• When this country needed support last winter for its Iraq policy, all 
of these countries signed a statement of support for the 
transatlantic relationship, despite considerable pressure against 
them from France and others.149  
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• They've acted as de facto allies. In fact they've acted as better allies 
than some of the members that are currently in NATO.150 
• They will be among our most committed allies when they walk 
through NATO's doors as full members.151 
The unanimous vote by the U.S. Senate in support of NATO’s further 
enlargement to Eastern Europe at a time when some Members of Congress are 
questioning NATO’s future as such shows that Eastern European countries are regarded 
as significant contributors to the Alliance in the eyes of Americans – bringing the 
Alliance strong values, extra troops152 and potentially new bases for U.S. and other 
NATO forces.153 In the words of Ambassador Nicholas Burns, “They don't just bring 
new capabilities to the table; they also bring strong political will to defend our way of 
life…. Size and geography and population count less than the political will to defend our 
principles and collective security.”154 
Although Eastern European countries may have had limited military significance 
in the Iraq crisis, these Eastern European countries gave the United States badly needed 
political capital.155   The  United  States  highly appreciates the support given by Eastern 
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European countries, especially because these Eastern European countries constituted as a 
recently democratized and progressive bloc unanimously supporting the U.S. policy in 
the Iraq crisis.156  
In May 2003, the President of the United States expressed gratitude to Eastern 
European countries for their support. “In the battle of Iraq, central and eastern European 
countries have stood with America and our coalition to end a grave threat to peace, and to 
rid Iraq of a brutal, brutal regime.”157 The U.S. public opinion polls showed that Eastern 
European support for the U.S. actions was welcomed. The Eastern European countries’ 
pro-American positions definitely helped the formation of the United States-led 
international coalition of the willing.158 
The Eastern European countries want to be viewed as nations that revitalize 
NATO and transatlantic relations, and that better equip the Alliance to deal with 
traditional and new dangers.  
During the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, all the Eastern European countries which have 
already been invited to join NATO or which are still in NATO aspirant status wanted to 
demonstrate that they are “de facto Allies” in the war on terror by making serious 
contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan. Moreover, Eastern European countries showed their military value 
by allowing the United States to use their airspace and military bases and by contributing 
forces to the U.S.-led international post-conflict reconstruction coalition in Iraq. 
According to Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and 
NATO Affairs, “They have demonstrated by risking their own blood that they not only 
understand the responsibility of NATO membership, they embrace it.”159  
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Through their support for the U.S. position in the Iraq crisis, Albania, Croatia and 
FYROM have fortified their prospects for membership in NATO.160  
 
B. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 
The exchanges of highly negative rhetoric between France and Germany on one 
side and Eastern European countries on the other side started on 17 February 2003 when 
the President of France, Jacques Chirac, warned the Eastern European countries that 
support for the U.S. position on the Iraq crisis could put in jeopardy their chances of 
joining the EU. 
To quote Chirac, “that isn’t very responsible behaviour…. So I believe they have 
missed a good opportunity to remain silent.”161 Chirac added that ratification of the 
December 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit decision to invite 10 new countries would 
depend on the parliaments of the present 15 EU countries. 
Bulgaria and Rumania, because of their later prospects for EU membership and 
the Bulgarian role in the United Nations Security Council, received the most severe 
critique. Jacques Chirac declared that “Romania and Bulgaria were particularly 
irresponsible to get involved in that when their position is already very delicate with 
respect to Europe. If they wanted to reduce their chances of joining Europe, they couldn’t 
find a better way.”162 
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The chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, Elmar 
Brok of Germany’s Christian Democrat Union, made a direct link between EU accession 
perspectives and the Eastern European countries’ stands regarding the Iraq crisis by 
stating that the Eastern European countries “had prematurely rallied to the U.S. position 
in the Iraqi crisis: by disregarding EU positions, they could endanger their accession into 
the Union.”163 
Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the chairman of the EU 
Convention on the future of Europe, also addressed the Eastern European countries with a 
critical remark, noting “that the Maastricht treaty calls for EU member countries to 
support without reservation the EU joint foreign policy.”164 
The immediate reactions in Eastern European countries to the comments made by 
the President of France and other French and German leaders were straightforward and 
harsh. It should be taken into account that language in Euro-Atlantic relations at that time 
was inconsistent with diplomatic etiquette. The Eastern European countries’ critical 
responses varied from affirmations of national sovereignty and independence to denial of 
any connections between the crisis in Iraq and the EU enlargement process, as the 
following examples suggest: 
• We will speak when we consider it appropriate and we will say 
what we consider appropriate.165 
• We did stick our neck out, and we will not pull it back…My 
predecessor in 1939 hoped to keep a low profile, and it didn't 
work.166 
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• I am surprised to find a connection being made between positions 
on Iraq and membership talks with the EU. Entry talks are held 
under strictly set rules announced in advance.167  
• We expect that each country be judged according to its own 
accomplishments and not according to its position on one or 
another global issue.168 
• The last time we were told that [to keep quiet], it was from ... the 
Soviet Union.169 
Moreover, it should be noted that no “EU joint foreign policy” or “EU position” 
concerning the Iraq crisis existed formally prior to the EU summit in Brussels on 17 
February 2003. Several established European Union member states, including Britain, 
Italy, and Spain, opposed the policy of France and Germany regarding the Iraq crisis. The 
opinions of the French and German politicians represented their personal or national 
views regarding the Iraq crisis, not a unanimous EU position. As a Slovak Foreign 
Ministry spokesman noted, “The EU candidates had no chance to have the same stance as 
the EU, because the Union itself had not agreed on a common position until yesterday [17 
February 2003]”.170 
The Eastern European countries invited to join the EU welcomed the fact that the 
EU had found common language to address the Iraq crisis. However, this common EU 
position was the due paid to keep the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy afloat. 
The differences in the EU countries’ positions concerning the Iraq crisis persisted after 
this vaguely worded common view of the EU was approved.  
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the first EU member state leader who 
expressed support to the Eastern European countries for taking a pro-American position 
regarding the Iraq crisis. “The candidate states have the same right to present their 
position as the UK or France. I hope no one is trying to suggest they should not receive 
full rights in the EU, including the right to present their views.”171  
U.S. President George W. Bush pointed out during a speech in Poland on 31 May 
2003: “You have not come all this way, through occupations and tyranny and brave 
uprisings, only to be told that you must now choose between Europe and America.”172 
After the initial exchanges, mutual respect and constructive dialogue were 
restored. For example, Polish Defense Minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski announced that “The 
EU and NATO have seen divisions. The first conclusion that has to be drawn is: don't put 
oil on the fire, and contain the rhetoric.” Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski 
described the situation simply:  “This is a nervous time…Europe, NATO, the world 
needs cooperation, not divisions.”173 
The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, was the first statesman from 
France or Germany who tried to calm down the rhetoric concerning the Iraq crisis. In 
Fischer’s words, “I fully understand the reaction of Central European countries that 
survived 50 years of Soviet occupation and have a different attitude towards the United 
States. We have to overcome the differences of opinion.”174 German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder added:  “It is possible for friends to have different points of view.”175 
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NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson summarized one of the lessons of the 
dispute as follows: “You get the sensation at times that people expect NATO to behave 
like in the Warsaw Pact, where someone in Moscow or Washington decides and everyone 
falls in line…NATO’s not the Warsaw Pact.... Differences are the lifeblood of 
democracy.”176 
It seems that due to Germany’s geopolitical position maintaining good relations 
with the Eastern European countries is more important for Berlin than it is for Paris. With 
the emotional rhetoric caused by the Iraq crisis falling, Germany rapidly took action to 
restore the crisis-damaged links with neighboring Eastern European countries. 
Before the Iraq crisis the EU’s eastward enlargement was seen as an important 
national interest of Germany, a step that would strengthen Berlin’s position in Europe. 
According to Jacek Rostowski, a professor of economics at the Central European 
University in Budapest, with the Iraq crisis this perception in Germany has 
diminished.177 
Germany has been the biggest source of foreign investments in Eastern European 
countries; and for various geographical, political, and economic reasons Germany has 
been a major champion of Eastern European countries gaining EU membership.178 
 However, at least for now, Germany has diminished its reputation as the main advocate 
of the EU’s eastern enlargement.179  
France and Germany unquestionably have been the driving force behind EU 
enlargement. They have invested substantial political and economic resources in this 
process. In short, France and Germany have never seriously placed the enlargement of the 
EU into doubt. This did not even take place in the heat of the Iraq crisis quarrels. 
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Emotional words were never really backed up by the appropriate actions. If France and 
Germany had truly questioned EU enlargement, today the prospects of the Eastern 
European countries’ EU membership would be different. 
The enlargement of the EU is in the interests of both the Eastern and Western 
European countries. The current European Union members see it as a means to increase 
the economic and political power of the European Union. Eastern European countries see 
the EU as the accelerator of their economies and the proof of their moral “return to 
Europe.” The bitterness of the Iraq crisis rhetoric has not undermined the will of Eastern 
European countries to join the EU. This can be clearly seen in the highly positive 
outcomes of the recent referendums concerning the Eastern European countries’ 
accession to the EU. The relations of Bulgaria and Romania with France and Germany 
are getting back on a constructive track, and the next few years will decide the future of 
their EU membership (currently scheduled for 2007).  
Politically, however, some distrust has already been shown towards the Eastern 
European countries invited to join the EU, notably with regard to their potential impact 
on the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ten future EU 
members were excluded from the EU summit on 17 February 2003, a summit which was 
called to determine a common position regarding the Iraq crisis, because of what was 
seen as their excessively “pro-American” security policies. That is, they were seen as a 
U.S. “Trojan Horse” in the EU in the eyes of the French180 and, in a more sarcastic 
formulation, the U.S. “Trojan Donkey” in the eyes of the Germans.181 
The invitations (after the British and the Spanish governments lobbied the Greek 
EU presidency) to the Eastern European countries to participate in the EU summit were 
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extended in the morning on 13 February 2002.182 By the afternoon, after Belgium, France 
and Germany objected, the invitations were withdrawn.183 
The EU Greek presidency feared that the divisive crisis in NATO would spill over 
into the EU at the summit in Brussels on 17 February 2003. The potential incapacity to 
agree on a common view regarding the Iraq crisis could have been disastrous for the 
evolving EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.184 Belgium, France and Germany 
may have judged that the political stakes were too high to allow the pro-American 
Eastern European countries’ presence at a summit that was already a “high risk gamble” 
with unpredictable results.185 The Eastern European countries were irritated by the 
rejection because it implied that they were not regarded as legitimate de facto future 
partners by some Western European countries.186 
The Eastern European countries’ firm pro-American position also was a warning 
sign for France that the Eastern European members of the EU will not automatically 
express enormous gratitude for being allowed to join the EU, nor will they blindly 
endorse France’s aspirations to political primacy in the EU.187 
Eastern European countries hold that they will have a right to express their 
political views as freely as any other EU member country, and the notion that some 
countries are more important than others runs against the Eastern European perception of 
EU values. The Eastern European countries’ political views about the Iraq crisis 
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demonstrated that these countries are interested not simply in joining “Western Clubs” 
but also in being able to influence them.188  
The entry of Eastern European countries into the EU in May 2004 will probably 
influence the dynamics and balance of power within EU debates. If the eventual EU 
Constitution includes weighted majority voting mechanisms on CFSP questions, the 
Atlanticist camp within the EU led by Britain and Spain will in all likelihood obtain extra 
votes with the entrance of eight Eastern European countries in the EU in May 2004.  
Eastern European countries could already be considered as aligned with the group 
of continental flank countries (e.g., Britain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain) which pursue close security cooperation with the United States rather than 
hypothetical exercises in equilibrium building.189 
It is, moreover, probable that the membership of additional Eastern European 
countries in the EU and NATO will hamper the pursuit of the French/German design for 
a more independent European Union foreign and defense policy that would to some 
degree compete with U.S. dominance in world affairs.190 
The 2002-2003 Iraq crisis showed that European Union nations cannot always 
agree on the same threat assessment and policy regarding the use of military means, and 
the situation may become even more complicated when additional Eastern European 
countries become EU members in May 2004.191 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, most Eastern European countries aimed first of all to 
maintain positive relations with their main strategic partner, the United States. This 
priority was closely connected with NATO, Eastern Europe’s preferred collective defense 
organization. Eastern European governments were concerned that if they supported the 
position of France and Germany regarding the Iraq crisis, the greater U.S. frustration with 
present and future European NATO partners might have eventually led to a weakening of 
the NATO collective defense commitment and a reduction in U.S. interest in Europe. 
This outcome would have signified the disappearance of the security guarantee that most 
Eastern European countries have been seeking since the beginning of the 1990s and that 
they would prefer to rely on in the long term. These consequences would be absolutely 
contrary to the Eastern European security efforts since the early 1990s.  
Eastern European countries are prepared to make significant efforts to uphold 
NATO’s effectiveness. Support for the U.S. position in the Iraq crisis is definitely 
intended to diminish the possibility that the United States might fundamentally redefine 
its interests in Europe.192  
Indeed, the main mission of Eastern Europe in the future may be to keep the 
United States effectively engaged in Europe and to sustain NATO’s cohesion and 
relevance. It is possible that NATO will survive in the long term partly because Eastern 
European countries have enthusiastically embraced this alliance.193 
If the worst possible security scenario took place and the first fundamental 
cornerstone  of  the  Eastern European countries – NATO – crumbled, the second backup 
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cornerstone – to keep the United States effectively engaged in Europe – could still work 
to ensure their own national security needs if they had strong bilateral relations with the 
United States.194 
If a country wants strong support from allies in the future, it should consistently 
assist them in moments of need.  By supporting the United States today, the Eastern 
European countries are making a long-term investment in their own security.195 
Some observers have speculated that, as a result of the further deterioration of the 
relations between the United States and the Franco-German bloc, a different kind of 
trans-Atlantic alliance or ad hoc alliances among some NATO members may emerge in 
the future,196 and that Eastern European countries could play an even more significant 
strategic role in the new security arrangements. However, the pursuit of such a scenario 
would be extremely unpredictable and highly risky. The Eastern European countries 
would prefer to satisfy their security needs in NATO’s collective defense 
arrangements.197 In the words of the Minister of National Defence of Lithuania, Linas 
Linkevicius, “Ad hoc coalitions may provide a temporary salvation in an immediate crisis 
but only such a battle-scarred and storm-beaten organization as NATO can be a long term 
solution.”198 
The partnership of Eastern European countries with the United States has evolved 
in accordance with national interests since the early 1990s and has played an important 
role in defining these countries’ security policy priorities. This trend became publicly 
obvious in the Iraq crisis. However, security policy developments in Eastern Europe long 
ments were taking a pro-American course. ago indicated that these govern                                                 
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The manner in which the Iraq crisis is resolved – including the country’s post-war 
reconstruction and political orientation – will influence transatlantic relations. Priorities 
in transatlantic relations may well change. Eastern Europe’s strongly supportive pro-
American position may result in closer relations between the United States and Eastern 
Europe – that is, something similar to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
concept of “new” and “old” Europe.199 For example, it may affect prospects regarding 
the next round of NATO enlargement, the redeployment of U.S. troops in Europe, NATO 
policy towards the non-NATO countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Balkans, 
and Russia; and it may influence the further evolution of NATO’s collective security 
activities. 
The fact that most Eastern European countries decided to support the U.S. 
position regarding the Iraq crisis and thereby to pursue their hard security policy priority 
(keeping the United States in NATO and Europe) may influence their pursuit of their 
other security priority – the development of an enlarged EU. 
It seems that the current round of the EU enlargement process, which started in 
December 2002 at the Copenhagen EU Summit, when ten countries, including eight 
Eastern European countries, were invited to join the EU, with the final accession 
protocols to be signed in May 2004, despite some warning signals and even threats from 
French President Jacques Chirac, will not suffer from the difference between Eastern 
European views and the views of some Western European countries about resolving the 
Iraq crisis.  
The predominant attitude in France and Germany during the Iraq crisis revealed a 
perception that Eastern European countries lack appropriate gratefulness for the years of 
substantial EU regional aid provided to prepare these countries to enter the EU.200 
However, Eastern European countries regard EU enlargement as part of an historical 
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process of reuniting the continent and building stability in Europe, and not as a gesture of 
good will and generosity from the EU to its Eastern European neighbors.201 
The evolving EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has certainly suffered 
from the Iraq crisis, but it has probably been more affected by quarrels among current EU 
member states than by the pro-American position of the Eastern European countries 
invited to join the EU in 2004. 
Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, called the rift among 
European Union countries on the Iraq question the “greatest failure of foreign and 
security policy [of the EU].”202  
Nevertheless, the present inability of the EU member states to find common 
ground may reinforce the Eastern European perception of the United States and NATO as 
the only reliable security guarantors and may promote skeptical views in Eastern Europe 
regarding the usefulness of the EU’s efforts to define a CFSP.  
The predominant policy in the present situation illustrates security perceptions in 
Eastern Europe. Peace and stability in the “hard security” meaning in this region will 
probably remain dependent on the United States for a long time. Whether France and 
Germany – or the European Union as a whole – can ever replace the United States in 
protecting the national security interests of Eastern European countries remains to be seen 
in the future.  
Because of their national ambitions, some European Union countries (above all, 
France and Germany) have been reluctant to acknowledge this fact, and this reality has 
been received as an unexpected surprise. 
Eastern European countries’ stands regarding the Iraq crisis in 2002-2003 
represented a natural continuation of security policies initiated in the early 1990s, and 
presumably they will be sustained in the post-Iraq crisis era.  
                                                 
201 “Chirac Lambasting Prompts Sharp Reactions In Poland And Other Candidate Countries,” Polish News 
Bulletin, 20 February 2003, available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NEDB/message/610 [20 April 2003] 
202 Chris Patten quoted in “More Divided Than Ever, …”, El Pais - English Edition, 25 March 2003, available at 
http://www.topica.com/lists/nato1/read/message.html?sort=d&mid=907152353&start=479 [20 April 2003] 
 56
The reactions of most Eastern European governments to the Iraq crisis bring into 
focus these countries’ determination to connect their security policies and the future 
development of Eastern Europe with the strongest power in international affairs. Eastern 
European countries’ actions, reflecting a pro-American position regarding the Iraq crisis, 
must be understood as based on consistent pragmatic assessments of national interests in 
international security. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Ronald Asmus underlined the important future connection between Eastern European 
countries and the United States: “The United States is making the most sacred of all 
commitments -- a pledge to go to the defense of these countries in a future crisis.”203 
Eastern European countries hold that the United States is still needed in Europe. 
In the words of Aleksander Smolar, president of the Stefan Batory Foundation in 
Warsaw, “The U.S. is more credible for us as a guarantor of security than western 
Europe, which is still looking for an idea of security and cannot assure its reality.”204 
Indeed, they consider the United States their main partner in resolving future 
Eastern European security dilemmas.205 Despite the EU’s progress in the monetary and 
institutional spheres, reliable EU collective defense arrangements still seem distant and 
hypothetical.206 Although some leaders in France and Germany may judge that they no 
longer need United States protection, Eastern European countries regard the United States 
military umbrella as the main guarantee of their national security.207 The Eastern 
European countries see the United States as the only country with enough military 
capability and political will to defend them in a crisis.  
                                                 
203 Ronald Asmus, “The Future Of NATO,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1 April 
2003, available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/AsmusTestimony030401.pdf [20 May 2003] 
204 Aleksander Smolar quoted in Duncan Shiels, “East Europe Engaged to EU, Flirts With Old Flame US,” Daily 
News, 13 May 2003, available at http://www.dailynews.lk/2003/05/19/fea03.html [20 May 2003]  
205 Janet McEvoy, “Iraq Crisis Exposes Tussle For Eastern Europe’s Loyalties,” Agence France-Presse, 9 
February 2003, available at http://www.expandnato.org/nedbfeb03.html [20 April 2003]  
206 Paul Johnson, “Au Revoir, Petite France,” Wall Street Journal, 22 March 2003, available at 
http://www.travelbrochuregraphics.com/extra/au_revoir_petite_france.htm [20 April 2003] 
207 Max Boot, “Power: Resentment Comes With The Territory,” Washington Post, 23 March 2003, available at 
http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/292 [20 April 2003] 
 57
Consequently, for Eastern European countries reliance on the United States as the 
main security guarantor overshadows the possible risk of disappointing major EU 
countries such as France and Germany.208 
According to analyst Vladimir Socor, “Every one of these 13 nations knows that 
its entire future, its security and independence, are a function of membership in NATO, 
which is an alliance led by the United States. In fact, most of these countries regard their 
membership in NATO as a means to become allied to the U.S. The disparity of power 
between the U.S. and the other NATO members is so great that for the newly free 
nations, NATO is a means for a bilateral relationship with the United States.”209 
The threat perceptions and security values in Eastern European countries are 
different from those in Western Europe because of their different historical experiences, 
notably in the twentieth century. These countries experienced not only the rough and 
treacherous diplomacy of the interwar period (which culminated in the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact) and the harsh (and relatively short) Nazi occupation, but also the 
extremely long and severe Communist dictatorship. During the decades after 1945 in 
which Western European countries enjoyed freedom and democracy, the Eastern 
Europeans for nearly half a century suffered from Soviet totalitarianism. This grim 
historical experience and recently regained freedom and democracy have led Eastern 
European countries to look for the most reliable assurance of the irreversibility of their 
independence and sovereignty. This trend is highlighted in Eastern European confidence 
in the United States as their ultimate ally.210 
The Eastern Europeans are not only worried about the potential domination of the 
EU by France and Germany, but about the possibility that the United States may be 
excluded from European security affairs. The political fragmentation of Europe, the 
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frustration in the United States with European allies, and the potential weakening of 
NATO also reinforce the Eastern European countries’ concerns about the potential 
growth of Russian influence in these new circumstances.211 
Eastern European countries will not accept an overarching “pan-European” 
collective security arrangement distancing them from the United States. Moreover, 
Eastern European countries will not trade the U.S.-led NATO security umbrella for a 
hypothetical European Union defense. From a hard security perspective, Eastern 
European countries are fully satisfied to be or soon become NATO members.212 No 
Eastern European country wants to exchange NATO for the weaker and fractious 
European Union ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) led by France and 
Germany.213 Eastern European governments view NATO and the EU’s ESDP as 
complementary rather than competitive. 
Eastern European countries also do not want the ESDP to decrease the role of 
NATO or that of the United States in Europe. Any EU push in that direction or any sign 
of a United States return to isolationism that could lead to the removal of U.S. military 
capabilities in Europe would meet strong political resistance from Eastern European 
governments because U.S. disengagement would directly and inevitably undermine 
Eastern European security. 
From the point of view of Eastern European governments, NATO must remain 
the prime security guarantor and the permanent bridge closely binding the United States 
with Europe.214 
Before the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, Eastern European security policies could be 
described as moderately pro-American. The explicitness of the stands that all countries 
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had to take regarding how to resolve the Iraq crisis did not leave much space for 
diplomatic maneuvers by the countries of Eastern Europe. Due to these inflexible 
circumstances, Eastern European countries have moved toward even more pro-American 
political positions.  
Eastern European countries could not allow themselves to take risks concerning 
the future of NATO, given their deep doubts about the stability and reliability of the 
security environment since the beginning of the 1990s. The debates over the International 
Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the role of the United Nations in global affairs 
have shown that in “soft” security questions Eastern European countries do not 
necessarily share the U.S. positions. 
Eastern European countries have demonstrated that they want to participate 
actively in two alliances which are of major importance for the United States: NATO and 
the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism and rogue states.215 
The choice in this case for Eastern European countries was whether to get 
involved in questions affecting the strength and military reliability of NATO. They faced 
the extreme possibility of NATO’s collective defense value being undermined, with the 
Alliance transformed into an “OSCE-like organization,” if the United States decided to 
withdraw from Europe and NATO. Eastern European countries emphasized that the 
United States has new and reliable allies in Europe, and that they see NATO as the main 
venue for future cooperation.  
Eastern European reactions to the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis cannot be described in 
terms of an absolute choice between Europe and America or between the EU and NATO. 
Both NATO and the EU are top priorities for Eastern European governments, as well as 
good relations with the United States and the member nations of the European Union. 
When Eastern European countries decided to take their positions regarding the Iraq crisis, 
jeopardizing EU enlargement was not considered as a tradeoff or possible consequence of 
taking these positions. The EU member nations were not able to establish a durable 
common position on the Iraq crisis. 
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Concerning the hypothetical “choice” between NATO and the EU, for Eastern 
European countries the two organizations are interdependent and complementary.216 In 
the words of the Romanian Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase, “We should not be divided 
and we should not have false debates ... NATO and the EU are complementary 
organisations for us. We don't want to see Europe and America as rivals.”217  
The old questions in Europe about relations with the United States will take new 
forms with the inclusion of the Eastern European countries in NATO and the European 
Union.218 Eastern European countries will definitely have an important role in the future 
of transatlantic relations.219 
Another feature that highlighted Eastern European behavior at the time of the Iraq 
crisis was the appearance of Eastern Europe as a bloc. The unanimous voice of the 
Eastern European countries was heard clearly regarding both NATO and EU issues. 
Moreover, the unified position of Eastern Europe overshadows by far such traditional 
groupings as the Scandinavian countries or the European neutral and non-aligned states. 
The United States and many Western European countries now regard the Eastern Europe 
countries as a reliable bloc. If the Eastern European countries manage to maintain this 
bloc, they may well constitute an influential force in NATO as well as the EU. 
                                                 
216  “A Coalition Of The Moral, “Wall Street Journal Europe, 6 February 2003, available at 
http://www.expandnato.org/como.html [20 April 2003] 
217 Adrian Nastase quoted in Stefan Wagstyl, “Romania Fears Further Transatlantic Rift,” Financial Times, 13 
March 2003, available at http://www.gov.ro/presa/inftari/4/revp-030313-ft-intv-an.htm [20 April 2003] 
218 David Howell, “Is The “Other Europe” Emerging?”, Wall Street Journal Europe, 12 February 2003, available 
at http://www.davidhowell-themes.com/article72%20-%20Old%20Europe.htm [20 April 2003] 
219“More Divided Than Ever, …,” El Pais - English Edition, 25 March 2003, available at 





























INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Prof. David Yost 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Colonel Hans-Eberhard Peters 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
